Asian Affairs: In your opinion, is Iran developing nuclear weapons, or at least keeping that option alive? Mahan Abedin: Exactly a week ago I was at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and there's a big debate going on about whether Iran wants nuclear latency, as opposed to nuclear weapons. You would know much better than I that there is a huge difference between the two — having the latent capability, ie the knowhow and structure in place to potentially weaponise if the political will were to be generated, or if the geo-political scenario is more amenable to that type or posturing; or full-scale weaponisation, which would be very problematic. If we look at some of the other examples historically, if a country wants to come into possession of nuclear weapons, if they want to adapt that into their wider defence doctrine and strategic profile, it would be better to develop the posture of a nuclear weapons state before they actually acquire that weapon. India and Pakistan are good examples through two decades of developing this posture. Not necessarily consciously, but because of the lively debate they were having — particularly in India. You will know that the Indian media, for instance, well before India actually tested the bomb, they had this debate going on with some in favour and some against. The sum effect of all that activity by the political elite, military elite, the media, wider civil society — the debate that takes place around this issue — that enables the country to develop a nuclear weapons posture and hence that would make it easier for them to integrate their nuclear weapons in a wider defensive doctrine once they come in possession of it, and Iran hasn't done this at all. AA: Could you define what you mean by nuclear posture? MA: Well, basically fine-tuning your strategic defence posture to that of a nuclear weapons power. Once you come into possession of that capability, that's going to alter your strategic profile and that would affect your foreign policy, in particular your policy towards your immediate neighbours. So if Iran wants to develop nuclear weapons, that's going to alter dramatically their relationship with their immediate neighbours — with Iraq, with the Gulf states, with the Saudis, even with a country like Pakistan. So they need to start thinking about how that change is going to come about, how they are going to manage that change. AA: Is there any evidence of Iran doing that yet? MA: What's going on behind the scenes and what the country's official institutions the foreign ministry, the defence establishment, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps they may be working on this from an intellectual software point of view. But as far as information in the public domain is concerned, that's all too critical because this has to be a transparent process, there is no evidence of it. In fact if you review the academic literature, by and large the academics are decidedly against this idea of nuclear weapons. These are academics favoured by the establishment. They're not subversive voices, they are voices of the establishment and they really think that nuclear weapons are not in Iran's best interest. It will complicate the country's foreign policy, it will create a lot of headaches for the immediate neighbours but also in relation to the external powers — like the United States. So in answer to your question, I do not believe Iran is developing nuclear weapons. We can go back and discuss the NIE (National Intelligence Estimates of the US government) from 2007, which states quite categorically that Iran has stopped its nuclear weapons programme. But that of course means it had a programme prior to stopping it. I'm not in a position to comment authoritatively on that report, but I think as of now I can confidently state there is no nuclear weapons programme. Latency — ie having the infrastructure in place — enrichment facilities and possibly working on vehicles, working on drivers, missile platforms, possibly there is some work going on. But then other questions arise, like degree of capability. Some would argue that Iran already has a latent capability. So if they decided to weaponise, they could probably do it in a year or two. Some say that, but I don't believe that Iran has that latent capability. I think it is working towards that trajectory, but then the question would arise of the degree of that capability and what time frame key decision-makers have in mind for actual weaponisation. Is it 10 –15 years, or even longer — which I believe is the case — or a shorter time frame? But then you would have to bring in all sorts of calculations into that, like the threat you perceive from the US, etc. AA: You say Iranian academics are against nuclear weapons, but what about Iranian public opinion in general? In other countries like India and Pakistan, public opinion was rather favourable prior to and after the tests. MA: That's because their elites were quite categorical, if not categorical at least there was a consensus among the elites that this was the outcome… Iran's elites have not said that. In terms of public opinion, it's very difficult to gauge public opinion in Iran. There has been some professional public opinion polling done, even by Western organisations, but l think even their results are open to dispute. Iranians generally do not respond well to any public opinion setting for various reasons. I think broadly speaking — based on my own interactions with Iranian society — I would be surprised if a majority of the public was against the policies of the present government. I think by and large they would be supportive because by and large this is how the government has pitched it. The previous government, led by Khatami and also the incumbent led by Ahmadinejad, links this to the country's scientific developments, they say this is crucial for energy and they are right. The Iranian nuclear programme is part of our diversifying energy sources. There's no doubt about that. It may have a nuclear weapons dimension but that's beside the point. It is also about energy. On a broader canvas they set out a comparative framework. They say, look other countries are able to develop this capability without being harassed. Why is Iran being singled out? They also say, look you have a power in the Middle East that has 200 nuclear warheads — undeclared. It's not a member of the NPT, not subject to any kind of inspection, yet all the spotlight, all the pressure, is on Iran. I think Iranian public opinion responds very favourably to that because that's a clear case of double standards. So the government is able to exploit these sensitivities very well and I think by and large they have the public behind them. Now, nuclear weapons is a different issue altogether and I am not aware of any proper professional, reliable, large-scale opinion poll done on this. AA: What is the significance of the latest IAEA resolution on Iran? MA: If you study the report very carefully, it doesn't depart radically from the findings of the NIE back in December 2007. There are only three or four points which are relatively new. I've studied it quite carefully and I'm at a loss about what new information we have. The NIE concluded quite categorically that Iran halted all nuclear weapons in the Fall of 2003. There's nothing in this new report which departs radically from that. There are three or four new items there which are really not that exciting. The pre issue media excitement was… there's a disconnect between that and the actual report itself. But the report itself isn't that sexy. Certainly, it doesn't produce a smoking gun and there's nothing in there which would suggest beyond reasonable doubt that Iran has an active nuclear weapons programme. There are certainly issues that Iran needs to clear up but this is a historical thing with the IAEA. There are a set of questions it says Iran doesn't clear up in full. Iranians would say: every time the IAEA submit their questions, we reply in full. There is clearly an informational deficit there which the two sides have to work out. But also bear in mind the Iranians have said repeatedly they would like to resolve this issue once and for all at the IAEA level, ie at a technical level. AA: Do you think an Israeli attack on Iran is imminent? MA: Well, maybe not imminent, but I think it can't be ruled out altogether — especially if we view that Israel can behave irrationally when it comes to its own perceptions of its national security. Let's start off with asking if the Israelis really believe their own rhetoric. One of the Israeli arguments, especially the hard core, right-wing ones, is that Iran is developing nuclear weapons to destroy Israel. Do they actually believe that? I suspect not, because the Israelis presumably know that Iran is a rational actor and at a pure strategic level, Iran and Israel are not necessarily enemies. There's an ideological enmity for sure, there's a war of words between the two states, but it shouldn't necessarily go beyond that. If the Israelis come to the conclusion of Iran achieving a clear-cut latent capability, that would have a significant bolstering effect on their position in the region. Mainly, it would embolden the proxies at Iran's disposal, particularly Hezbollah. AA: I'll come to that, but my question was if an Israeli attack is imminent. MA: I think not but it cannot be ruled out. If you look at the response by the Iranian side, they fear a US attack far, far more. In fact they discount an Israeli attack altogether. Let me just tell you why I think an Israeli attack is unlikely. I won't labour the classic points about capabilities, potential Iranian responses — ie whether they will be directed by proxies — but l think one of the reasons that is not discussed about why Israel would be reluctant to attack is the issue of prisoners. Take the Sergeant Shalit case, for example. It took the Israelis five years to free this man. He was a Hamas prisoner. They paid an extremely high price for his release. They released 1200-plus Palestinian prisoners, some of whom were very heavyweight. They had a lot of blood on their hands, as the Israelis would see it. Now imagine — and this is a plausible scenario — in the course of an attack on Iranian facilities, it is entirely possible that some Israeli fighter jets could be shot down and that some Israeli pilots could be taken into custody. The process that Israel would have to travel to secure their release would be an absolute nightmare and they would pay such a high price for that, both financial and political. So in answer to your question, I would say it [an Israeli attack] is not imminent. It is certainly within the realms of possibility and the Israelis are repeatedly threatening Iran with aggression; but I think it's unlikely. AA: What would be the impact of such an attack, hypothetical though it might be at the moment? MA: It's purely speculative at the moment, but I think Iran would respond very robustly. Iran has the capability of mid-range ballistic missiles. They would attack and that would be very serious for Israel. Look at the explosion that took place in Kharaj [in mid November]. Now there is a lot of conflicting information about what exactly exploded, but the consensus appears to be that there were basically two or three missiles — ICBM missiles — but it just shows you the explosive capability of these devices. It's really funny because I was scouring some of the more extreme websites connected to the Baseej militia — and these are completely unofficial, by the way — and one of them said if a couple of them shake the hand, imagine what hundreds would do to Tel Aviv. For me that was quite interesting. Iran certainly has the ability to bring pain to Israeli city dwellers. An attack by proxies, that is also very feasible. I don't think there would be a Sunni-Shia divide [in the event of war], I think the region would be united, at least on a popular level, in revulsion against an Israeli attack. But in terms of actual manoeuvring on the ground, Iran can rely to some extent on Hamas and to some extent on the Palestinian Islamic Jihad to agitate. I don't think they would do much, but Hezbollah certainly has the ability to attack. Whether they would do so, I don't think that could be taken for granted. If Hezbollah attacks Israel with rockets, that would invite an Israeli response and the political fall-out for Hezbollah within Lebanon would be huge. What the Lebanese would say, quite rightly, is why should we get involved in other people's wars, and that would affect Hezbollah's image in certain sections of Lebanese public opinion that Hezbollah is ultimately a tool of Iran. So the assumption that Iran's proxies would automatically hit Israel, this is problematic. But I think Hezbollah would react to an Israeli attack because this would be such a huge thing and I think Lebanese public opinion would be tentatively behind. If Israel inflicts the same kind of pain on Lebanon as it did in July 2006, that remains to be seen. Presumably, they would be constrained by a direct Iranian military threat as well because Iran is involved directly through the use of ballistic missiles. So Iran has the ability to inflict pain on Israel should the Israelis attack. AA: What do you think of reports that foreigners have been involved in Iran's nuclear programme, for example the Russian/Ukranian scientist Vyacheslav Danilenko? MA: That's been discredited. Danilenko is a diamond expert or something like that.. Of course in the early stages of the Iranian nuclear programme, post-revolution after 1979, Iran revived its nuclear programme after 1985 and in those early years there was substantial help from foreign experts, including AQ Khan. It's been documented that representatives of his network met officials of the Iranian government and large sums of money changed hands as a result. But I think Iran now is in a position to develop capability indigenously in a wide range of sectors, not just nuclear power and even potentially nuclear weapons, but ballistic missiles and other defence technology. Iran is not as underdeveloped as people think. They are very resourceful people and also highly committed as well. I don't think we should underestimate their abilities. I think the Iranian nuclear infrastructure as a whole is indigenous. Certainly on the nuclear energy front Iran has sought out extensive help from the Russians, that's official. The Russians of course helped to construct the Bushehr nuclear reactor. As far as the more clandestine facilities are concerned, I don't believe there is substantial help from foreigners: one because it's not really needed and secondly because it's a security issue for the Western services to identify, penetrate and sabotage.
An Israeli attack on Iran is not imminent, although it cannot be ruled out, says Iran-born Mahan Abedin, Director of Research at the London-based Centre for the Study of Terrorism and an expert on Iranian politics. Reports of such an attack, Abedin told Asian Affairs' Shyam Bhatia, are speculative, but if it does happen Iran would likely retaliate with its mid-range ballistic missiles and via its proxies like Hezbollah.